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Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice is a major philosophical study of the concept of 
justice as mutual advantage, conducted within the framework of modern game theory 
(Vanderschraaf, 2018; henceforth SJ).  Vanderschraaf sees himself as working in the 
tradition of David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40/ 1978; henceforth 
Treatise) and Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles 
of Morals (1748-51/ 1975; henceforth Enquiries); he describes Hume as among ‘the 
greatest justice-as-mutual-advantage theorists’ (SJ, xi–xii).  I have worked in this 
tradition too, particularly as the author of The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and 
Welfare (Sugden, 2004; henceforth ERCW).  Naturally, I am interested in similarities and 
differences between Vanderschraaf’s analysis and my own. 
 I was particularly struck by Vanderschraaf’s discussion of the ‘Vulnerability 
Objection’ to theories of justice as mutual advantage.  Defining members of society as 
vulnerable if they are ‘unable through their own efforts to contribute to the cooperative 
surplus’, he takes it to be uncontroversial that if a putative theory of justice as mutual 
advantage ‘denies the vulnerable any of its advantages’, then that theory is ‘no proper 
account of justice at all’ (SJ: 281).  Vanderschraaf argues that many theories of justice as 
mutual advantage, including Hume’s, do deny the benefits of justice to the vulnerable.  
His preferred characterization of justice as mutual advantage allows (but does not 
require) the rules of justice to protect the vulnerable.  His discussion of vulnerability 
focuses on a game that is created by adding vulnerable individuals to the ‘Mutual Aid 
Game’ that I introduce in ERCW. 
 I will argue that Vanderschraaf is overlooking crucial differences between what 
Hume intends his theory to do and what Vanderschraaf means by an ‘account of justice’.  
I will try to show that the problem of vulnerability is less stark if one takes the more 
Humean approach of ERCW. 
1.  The problem of vulnerability 
Modern theorists of justice as mutual advantage are often troubled by the thought that, if 
society were viewed only as a cooperative venture, people who were unable to contribute 
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anything to that venture would have no claim on the surplus that it produced.
1
  A famous 
expression of that thought appears in Hume’s Enquiries, and is important for 
Vanderschraaf’s claim that the Vulnerability Objection applies to Hume’s theory. 
 Before examining what Hume says, let me say that there are discontinuities 
between the Treatise and the Enquiries, and that I when I talk about Hume’s theory of 
justice, I will mean the theory presented in the Treatise.
 2
  In the passage in the Enquiries, 
Hume is trying to show that ‘public utility is the sole origin of justice’ (Enquiries: 184).  
He presents a disturbing thought experiment: 
Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though 
rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that 
they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest 
provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary 
consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the laws of humanity to 
give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie 
under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any 
right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary lords.  (Enquiries: 190) 
There are uncomfortable similarities between Hume’s imaginary species and vulnerable 
groups in the real world.  Vanderschraaf’s category of the vulnerable includes infants, 
young children, the demented old and (a particularly troubling case) people who are 
permanently and severely disabled from birth (SJ: 280).  Hume is clearly uncomfortable 
about the implications of his argument for (what was then) the relationship between 
native peoples and European settlers in the Americas.  The Europeans, he says, have been 
                                                 
1
 Two examples: Having said that his account of justice is based on the idea that society is to be 
conceived as a fair system of cooperation, Rawls (2003: 20–21) says: ‘Given this aim, I put aside 
for the time being these temporary disabilities [i.e. illness and accident] and also permanent 
disabilities or mental disorders so severe as to prevent people from being cooperative members of 
society in the usual sense’ (p. 20) and ‘In any case, we should not expect justice as fairness, or 
any account of justice, to cover all cases of right and wrong’ (p. 21).  Gauthier (1986: 268) 
acknowledges that moral constraints deriving from mutual advantage ‘do not correspond in every 
respect to the “plain duties” of conventional morality. Animals, the unborn, the congenitally 
handicapped and defective, fall beyond the pale of a morality tied to mutuality.’ 
2
 Despite the fact that Hume ‘cast anew’ the arguments of the Treatise in his later Enquiries, 
asking that the latter be treated as the definitive statement of his philosophical principles 
(Enquiries: 2), I believe that work of the younger Hume is philosophically and psychologically 
deeper.   
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‘tempted to imagine’ that this relationship was like that between human beings and the 
imaginary species in his example.  Giving in to this temptation, they have often ‘thrown 
off all restraints of justice, and even of humanity’ in their treatment of the native peoples 
(Enquiries: 191).  Since Hume does not discuss this case any further, it is difficult to 
know how he would support the claim that the Europeans’ actions were not only 
inhumane but also unjust.  
 Vanderschraaf interprets Hume as acknowledging that his theory of justice is 
inconsistent with the principle that ‘vulnerable members of society are owed some 
benefits of justice’ – a principle that Vanderschraff claims is a widely held ‘considered 
judgment regarding justice’ (SJ: 281, 283).  I will ask whether there is a genuine 
inconsistency. 
2.  What is justice? 
Vanderschraaf declares his objective on his first page: 
[H]ere is the thesis: Justice is convention.  I believe that this justice-as-
convention thesis, properly developed, provides the most cogent 
characterization of the general theory of justice as conceived as a system of 
rules for mutual benefit, or justice as mutual advantage.  (SJ: xi) 
But what does Vanderscrhaaf mean by ‘justice’ when he claims that justice is mutual 
advantage?  He gives further clues when, still on the first page, he says: 
Plato set a template for all future philosophers by raising two interrelated 
questions: (1) What precisely is justice?  (2) Why should one be just?  One 
simple pair of answers to these questions had some currency even in Plato’s 
Athens: (i) Justice is a system of requirements that are conventions, that is, 
mutually advantageous arrangements, of one’s society, and (ii) Given their 
conventional nature, one has good reasons to obey these requirements simply 
because obedience serves one’s own ends given others’ expected obedience.  
(SJ: xi). 
For Vanderschraaf, ‘justice as mutual advantage’  is an answer to questions (1) and (2); 
the content of that answer is (i) and (ii). 
 Plato’s questions seem to presuppose that some moral entity called ‘justice’ 
already exists.  Rather like European explorers who, after the coastline of Africa had been 
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mapped, set out to investigate the geography of the interior, philosophical explorers can 
investigate what the properties of justice really are.  Vanderschraaf’s discussion of the 
Vulnerability Objection implies that we can all express our ‘considered judgements’ 
about justice, knowing what it is that we are expressing judgements about. 
 This way of thinking about justice is foreign to the logic of Hume’s Treatise. 
Hume presents the Treatise as a work of experimental psychology.  Its full title is: A 
Treatise of Human Nature: being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of 
reasoning into moral subjects.  According to the Introduction, it is to be a contribution to 
the ‘science of man’– a subject that is fundamental to the all the other sciences, among 
which Hume includes philosophy.  Its methodology is to be that of the natural sciences, 
based on ‘experience and observation’ (Treatise: xvi).  Hume’s discussion of justice is in 
Book III of the Treatise, entitled ‘Of Morals’.  Here, the objective is to achieve an 
empirical explanation of moral feelings.  Hume famously argues that vice and virtue are 
not matters of fact, referring to objects outside our minds; the only matter of fact about 
vice is the ‘feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it’ (Treatise: 468–9).  
That is all there is to moral obligation:   
All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality of 
the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and when the 
neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we say that 
we lie under an obligation to perform it.  (Treatise: 517) 
Hume wants to explain the sense of moral obligation in terms of more basic human 
emotions of sympathy.  He thinks that such an explanation is unproblematic for the 
‘natural virtues’ of benevolence, humanity and parental care:   
Tho’ there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity wou’d lead 
us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises 
from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of humanity.  A 
father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: But he has also a 
natural inclination to it.  (Treatise: 518–519) 
 The example of parental care is particularly significant, because Vanderschraaf 
explicitly includes young children in the category of the vulnerable.  It seems safe to assume 
that, in Hume’s view, the obligation of the father to take care of his children – that is, the 
sense of blame that attaches to a man who wilfully fails to meet this obligation – is just as 
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strict as, say, the obligation in justice to repay a debt.  Hume is serious too about the 
obligation to relieve destitution: ‘A rich man lies under a moral obligation to communicate 
to those in necessity a share of his superfluities’ (Treatise: 482).  We should not assume 
that Hume is thinking of this merely as an imperfect duty of charity.  In eighteenth-
century Britain, every parish was required by law to provide relief to destitute 
inhabitants, and to provide care for ‘pauper children’; these activities were financed by 
local property taxes.  Hume may have seen these practices as codifications of the 
obligation of the relatively well-off to contribute to the support of the desperately poor.  
Nevertheless, for Hume these are ‘natural obligations’, not obligations of justice.  The 
difference is not a difference of moral force or of legal status.  It is a difference between 
the causes of the feelings that constitute the moral obligations. 
 I maintain that the Platonic reading of the question ‘What precisely is justice?’ is 
out of place in a discussion of Hume’s theory.  If the Vulnerability Objection is rephrased 
as claiming that Hume’s theory denies that the vulnerable are owed any moral 
obligations, one immediate answer is that there are obligations of humanity as well as of 
justice. 
3.  Hume’s two-stage theory: the origin of justice 
Hume has a special interest in obligations of justice because they present a challenge for 
his sentiment-based theory of morals.  For Hume, ‘justice’ is simply the customary name 
for a particular subset of the set of general rules that are in fact recognized as morally 
obligatory in most societies.  The rules of justice are those rules that secure three 
fundamental social practices: ‘stability of possession’, ‘transference of property by 
consent’, and ‘performance of promises’ (Treatise: 484–534).  Significantly, Hume refers 
to these rules as ‘what we now call the rules of justice and equity’ (Treatise: 505, 
emphasis added). 
 The challenge is that, although these rules are in fact perceived as moral 
obligations, it is implausible to assume that human beings have a natural inclination to 
conform to them.  Actions that are naturally perceived as virtuous directly induce 
positive emotions, such as the pleasure of sympathy.  In contrast, the actions that are 
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required by a rule of justice are virtuous only indirectly: it is only by recognizing the 
value of the rule that we can recognize the value of individual instances of conformity to 
it (Treatise: 477–484).  Thus, an explanation of the obligation of justice must be a two-
stage theory.  It must first explain how there can be general conformity to the rules of 
justice, prior to those rules being perceived as morally obligatory.  It must then explain 
why, as Hume puts it, ‘we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice’ 
(Treatise: 498). 
 The first stage of Hume’s theory works by way of his analysis of convention, 
which he presents in relation to the rule of stability of possession (Treatise: 484–501).  
The core features of this analysis can be reconstructed by using an idealized game-
theoretic framework developed by David Lewis (Convention: 36–42).  This framework is 
simpler than the one used by Vanderschraaf, but it is more transparent and is sufficient 
for my purposes.   
 Suppose that the members of some population recurrently engage with one 
another in some given type of interaction.  (A single episode of interaction need not 
involve all members of the population, but every individual has some chance of 
interacting with every other.)  This interaction (the recurrent game) is represented as a 
game in strategic form.  Following Lewis, I treat payoffs as ‘rough indications of strength 
of preference’.  I make no distinction between preference and Hume’s concept of 
‘interest’, and do not make it a matter of definition that individuals always act according 
to their preferences.  In Lewis’s terminology, any list of strategies, one strategy for each 
player role in the recurrent game, is a (potential) regularity of behaviour in the 
population.  
 Now consider any regularity R such that the following three conditions are true 
and, in the sense defined by Lewis (1969: 52–60), common knowledge:
 3
 
 (C1)  Everyone conforms to R; 
(C2)  Everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;  
                                                 
3
 Lewis’s concept of ‘common knowledge’ is formulated in terms of what people have reason to 
believe, not what they actually believe or know.  On this, see Cubitt and Sugden (2003). 
 
 
8 
 
(C3)  Everyone prefers to conform to R, conditional on everyone else conforming.  
Conditions C2 and C3 are equivalent to saying that R is a Nash equilibrium in the 
recurrent game.  Translated into Lewis’s framework, Hume’s description of the rule of 
stability of possession clearly satisfies C1, C2 and C3. 
 However, Hume wants to say more than this.  He is not using ‘convention’ merely 
as a technical term.  In its linguistically proper sense, ‘convention’ implies agreement.  
Hume wants to say that the rules that he calls conventions are like agreements.  The rule 
of stability of possession, as he has described it,         
 … may properly enough be call’d a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho’ 
without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a 
reference to those of the other, and are perform’d upon the supposition, that 
something is to be perform’d on the other part.  (Treatise: 490) 
The idea of agreement is important for Hume’s suggestion that this rule can emerge 
spontaneously in a society in which self-interested individuals interact recurrently: 
Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv’d from 
human conventions, that it arises gradually, and by a slow progression, and by 
our repeated experiences of the inconveniences of transgressing it.  (Treatise: 
490) 
Hume does not explain this process, but one might imagine it originating in, and 
gradually expanding from, implicit agreements among small groups of self-interested 
individuals who find it mutually advantageous to respect one another’s possessions.      
 The additional property that establishes R as a convention is a condition of mutual 
advantage.  In the case of justice: 
[‘T]is certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or indeed 
absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, and the well-being of every 
individual.  ...  And even every individual person must find himself a gainer, 
on ballancing the account; since, without justice, society must immediately 
dissolve...’  (Treatise: 497). 
The implication is that benefit is to be measured relative to the state of affairs that would 
exist if the relevant interaction were not governed by any rule.  Let us call this the no-rule 
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baseline.  If we bracket out the problem of specifying exactly what is meant by ‘not being 
governed by any rule’, we can state a fourth condition simply as: 
(C4)  The state in which everyone conforms to R is preferred by everyone to 
the no-rule baseline.   
A Humean convention can be defined as a regularity R such that there is common 
knowledge that C1, C2, C3 and C4 hold. 
 Hume argues that each of the three rules of justice satisfies these conditions.  In 
doing so, he claims to have fully explained ‘the natural obligation to justice, viz. interest’ 
(Treatise: 498).  In other words, he has explained how a state of affairs in which the 
members of a society conform to the rules of justice could come into existence and 
persist over time.  This explanation has not relied on any assumptions about morality; 
individuals have been assumed to act only on self-interest. 
 Stripped to its most basic features, and applied to a society of non-vulnerable 
people, Vanderschraaf’s characterization of justice as convention is the conjunction of 
C1, C2, C3 and a particular version of C4.
4
  The distinctive feature of Vanderschraaf’s 
C4 is its definition of the no-rule baseline.  This definition is complicated and its rationale 
is not fully explained, but the intuitive idea is that the baseline is a state of ‘free-for-all’ 
interaction in which each individual tries to gain at the expense of the others, without any 
restraint – not even of prudence, caution or rationality (SJ: 112).  Whether or not this is 
what Hume has in mind, Vanderschraaf’s chararcterization of justice is broadly similar to 
Hume’s analysis of the natural obligation to justice.  But Vanderschraaf does not address 
the question that Hume’s analysis is intended to answer:  Why, as a matter of empirical 
psychology, is justice perceived as obligatory?  That is the second stage of Hume’s 
theory. 
4.  Hume’s two-stage theory: annexing the idea of virtue to justice 
                                                 
4
 See SJ, pp. 273–280.  Vanderschraaf states an additional condition which (roughly speaking) 
requires that each person exercises some restraint.  Given the nature of the free-for-all baseline, 
this is not very demanding.  In the final few pages of SJ, Vanderschraaf proposes a further 
condition to eliminate equilibria that are not ‘genuinely just’.  However, he offers little 
explanation of why, if justice is mutual advantage, this condition is one of genuine justice. 
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At this point in his argument, Hume switches from an analysis of the origin of justice in 
small societies to an analysis of the maintenance of justice in larger ones.  He continues 
to assume common knowledge that C1, C2, C3 and C4 hold (with ‘preference’ 
interpreted as interest, and perhaps with ‘almost everyone’ substituted for ‘everyone’).  
However, he does not claim that conformity to the rules of justice can be sustained 
entirely by self-interest.  That is true ‘on the first formation of society’, before society has 
‘become numerous, and has encreas’d to a tribe or nation’.  But in a large society, each 
person’s interest in the general practice of justice is more remote.  In consequence, each 
individual is tempted to commit unilateral violations of the rules of justice.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, Hume still claims that such violations are contrary to the individual’s long-
term interest, because of their tendency to undermine the general practice of justice.
5
  But 
because people can be ‘blinded by passion, or byass’d by [some] contrary temptation’, 
C3 is not sufficient to motivate conformity to the rules of justice (Treatise: 498–501).  
  Nevertheless, by virtue of C4, unilateral violations of justice are still ‘prejudicial 
to human society’, and so evoke sentiments of disapproval from unbiased bystanders.  
These sentiments are induced by natural psychological mechanisms: a bystander who 
observes one person i in danger of being treated unjustly by another person j ‘partakes of 
[i’s] uneasiness by sympathy’.  In Hume’s sentiment-based theory, this amounts to saying 
that everyone is under an obligation to conform to the rules of justice.  Hume does not 
claim that this sense of obligation, when combined with interest, is sufficient to motivate 
conformity: he argues that large societies need governments to enforce the rules of justice 
(Treatise: 534–539).  Nevertheless, the rules that governments are enforcing are moral 
obligations.  Hume concludes: ‘Thus self-interest is the original motive to the 
establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral 
approbation, which attends that virtue’  (Treatise: 498–500). 
                                                 
5
 This is surprising, given that Hume recognizes the free-rider problem in his analysis of 
voluntary contributions to the public good of draining a meadow (Treatise: 538).  Hume may 
have had second thoughts about his claim that, in large societies, unilateral violations of justice 
are always contrary to self-interest.  In the Enquiries, he does not contradict the ‘sensible knave’ 
who thinks that an act of injustice ‘will make a considerable addition to his fortune without 
causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy’ (Enquiries: 282). 
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5.  Normative expectations 
Lewis’s Convention (1969) was the first game-theoretic reconstruction of Hume’s theory 
of justice.  In ERCW, I build on Lewis’s work, combining it with ideas from evolutionary 
game theory.  Lewis offers an analysis of convention, and says that this ‘turns out to be’ 
the concept that Hume uses in his discussion of the origin of justice and property 
(Convention: 3–4).  His definition of convention uses C1, C2 and C3, but replaces C4 
with:
6
 
 (C5)  Conditional on his own conformity to R, each individual prefers (i) the 
state in which every other individual conforms to R to (ii) any state in which 
exactly one other individual fails to conform to R. 
A regularity that satisfies C1, C2, C3 and C5 is a Lewisian convention. 
 Hume’s C4 is based on a comparison between universal conformity to R and 
universal non-conformity.  In contrast, C5 compares universal conformity with unilateral 
non-conformity.  For example, think of the British regularity ‘Drive on the left-hand side 
of the road’.  To say that this satisfies C4 is to say that everyone prefers that this rule 
exists, rather than that there is no rule to keep vehicles from collision courses.  To say 
that the rule satisfies C5 is to say that every driver who keeps left prefers that no other 
individual driver fails to keeps left.  C4 assesses the rule from outside – from a viewpoint 
that considers the possibility that it might not exist.  C5 assesses the rule from inside – 
from a viewpoint that assumes its existence.  Of these two conditions, C4 is more suitable 
for an explanation of how conventions originate as tacit agreements in small societies, but 
C5 is more suitable for an explanation of why, in large societies, conformity to ongoing 
conventions is perceived as morally obligatory.   
 Lewis uses C5 to argue that conventions are ‘a species of norms: regularities to 
which we believe one ought to conform’ (Convention: 97–100).  In ERCW I defend a 
generalization of this argument: if any regularity R satisfies C1, C2 and C5, it creates a 
                                                 
6
 See Lewis’s ‘first, rough, definition’ of convention (Convention: 42).  Lewis imposes the 
additional condition that there is some (potential but not actual) regularity R, distinct from R, that 
also satisfies C3 and C5.  This condition expresses an aspect of the ordinary-language meaning of 
‘convention’, but it plays no role in Lewis’s analysis of normativity.  
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normative expectation of conformity – the perception that conformity to R is a moral 
obligation.  The underlying psychology is the natural feeling of resentment that is cued 
when one person’s empirically well-grounded expectation about another person’s 
behaviour is frustrated by the latter’s deliberate and harmful action, combined with the 
sympathy that R-following bystanders feel for that resentment (Sugden, 1998; ERCW: 
149–165, 214–218).
7
 
6.  The Mutual Aid Game 
In ERCW I describe and analyse a Mutual Aid Game whose structure generalizes Hume’s 
famous example of the two farmers who need each other’s help in bringing in their 
harvests (Treatise: 520–521).  My game is presented as a model of a practice followed in 
some working-class communities in Britain before the development of the Welfare State.  
If one member of a group of co-workers was unable to work because of sickness or 
injury, he was supported by money raised from the rest of the group in a voluntary 
collection.  In my model, there is a group of workers who interact in each of a potentially 
infinite series of periods, but with some constant probability that the game will end after 
each period.  In each period, one randomly selected worker is sick, and each other worker 
chooses whether or not to contribute to a collection.  The utility cost of each contribution 
is significantly less than the utility benefit it gives to the recipient.  Consider the 
following regularity R.  At the start of the game, each group member is deemed to be in 
‘good standing’.  In each period, if and only if the sick worker is in good standing, all 
other workers contribute.  A worker loses his good standing if he fails to contribute in 
any period in which R requires this, but regains it after any period in which he has made a 
required contribution.  If the probability that the game ends is not too high, R is a 
Lewisian convention (ERCW: 127–132).  (On a natural interpretation of the no-rule 
baseline as the absence of the practice, R satisfies C4, and so is a Humean convention 
too.)  Thus, if everyone can in fact be expected to conform to R, conformity is also a 
normative expectation.  In Humean terms, it is a moral obligation.  
                                                 
7
 The analysis of resentment in ERCW draws on Adam Smith’s (1759/ 1976) analysis of fellow-
feeling.  The idea that people are motivated to confirm other people’s expectations appears in 
some later theories of ‘social preferences’ (e.g. Pelligra, 2005; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007).   
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 The essential idea of Vanderschraaf’s ‘Provider-Recipient Game’ can be 
represented by revising the Mutual Aid Game so that a small proportion of group 
members are vulnerable: they have the same liability to sickness as the others, but are 
permanently unable to make contributions (SJ: 287–292).  Consider the regularity R that 
differs from R in only one respect: vulnerable individuals are always deemed to have 
good standing.  If the proportion of vulnerable individuals is not too large, R is a 
Lewisian (and Humean) convention.  Thus, if everyone can be expected to conform to R, 
conformity to R – and thereby, giving aid to the vulnerable – is a moral obligation in 
Hume’s sense. 
 Vanderschraaf interprets this result as showing that obligations to the vulnerable 
can be part of (and not merely coexist with) a system of justice as mutual advantage.  I 
am not persuaded.  It seems self-evident to me that, in the revised Mutual Aid Game, the 
relationship between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable is not mutually advantageous.  
One way of seeing why not is to suppose that practices of mutual aid originate in, and 
expand out from, tacit agreements between pairs of self-interested individuals (such as 
Hume’s two farmers).  It is clear that there would be no such agreement between a person 
who was capable of giving aid and one who was not. 
 Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine how, once a practice of mutual aid between 
non-vulnerable individuals has become established – or perhaps even once the possibility 
of such a practice has been recognized – natural psychological processes could lead to the 
inclusion of the vulnerable.  One possibility is suggested by Hume’s idea (offered as an 
explanation of why people tend to disapprove of their own breaches of obligations) that 
‘[t]he general rule reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose’ (Treatise: 499).  
In the case of mutual aid, it is a small mental step to reinterpret the rule ‘Everyone who is 
not sick should contribute’ as ‘Everyone who is not sick should contribute if they can’.  
Perhaps unintentionally, Vanderschraaf suggests a different possibility when he says that 
it is a widely accepted considered judgement that ‘the vulnerable are not to be denied the 
benefits of justice merely because they are vulnerable’ (SJ: 281, emphasis added).  Notice 
that this formulation (unlike some others that Vanderschraaf uses) does not assert that the 
vulnerable are entitled to those benefits as a matter of justice.  It might more naturally be 
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interpreted as asserting an obligation of humanity.  Non-vulnerable individuals have set 
up a scheme that provides each of them with a vitally important form of insurance.  It 
would be inhumane for them to deny the benefits of this scheme to those of their fellows 
who, through no fault of their own, are unable to meet its entry requirements. 
 By adopting the revised good-standing rule, everyone meets an obligation of 
humanity.  Once that rule is in place, it is in everyone’s self-interest to conform to it, and 
everyone’s conformity induces in everyone a sense that conformity is morally obligatory.  
What more need one ask?  It seems that Vanderschraaf wants to be assured that the rule is 
a rule of justice.  As a disciple of Hume, I am not sure what that assurance would mean, 
nor why it would matter.   
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